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2022, a Consequential Year!

07 ديسمبر، 2022


Usually, at the closing of every year and the outset of another, it is common and typical for analysts in and beyond governments to assess the previous twelve months. 2022 and 2023 are no exceptions in this regard. In fact, they both offer a proliferation of important

issues worthy of discussion, that compel me to focus here on the most salient global issues.

 

2022 crystallized reflections and debates questioning the relevance of the prevailing international order. A few years back, the developing countries were the ones questioning the logic of sustaining a world order with essentially two or three poles, with the addition of China to Russia and America. This world order was based on concepts of ‘balance of power’ and respective spheres of influence. With the 2022 crisis in Ukraine and the already energetic hyperventilation by the United States towards China in anticipation of its potential encroachment on the former's interests, there were interesting additions and permutations to the debate around the dynamics of international arena.

 

Multipolarity, a Reality!

Russia and China, who used to traditionally be supportive of a limited polar system, both recently openly challenged the existing order; as having been distorted to serve America alone. They also questioned the presumption that the west was adopting a rules-based system, which was only meant to preserve western interests. And frankly, I share their challenge to this presumption. The western approach to international order is neither about 'rules' nor 'order', but rather about preserving American ‘exceptionalism’ and hegemony.

 

It is noteworthy that out of self-interest and acquired rights, Russia and China have both long accepted the United States as a principal and fellow pillar, not only politically but also by joining the financial order established in Bretton Woods, which is basically pegged to the US Dollar. Europe, while allied with the west, remains crucial for Russia's economy, yet it has high cost-driven preferences for neighbouring energy. Thus one can argue that both the Russians and the Chinese have been keenly interested in the other's markets, albeit both have recently raised the possibility of resorting to their or a basket of currencies besides the dollars, with Russia actually implementing this partially as a response to western sanctions.

 

All of this has driven a distinct wedge between the visions of the tri-polar world order. Russia and China have called for curtailing western pre-eminence. Some organizations, like the Shanghai Forum, are increasingly seen as different intergovernmental political fora, where the United States and its allies are not present or at least not dominant. This is new and noteworthy. Yet, neither of the three has submitted any serious proposals to substantially recalibrate and reform present intergovernmental organizations to become more cognizant and respective towards developing countries because this would also affect their stature and rights, for example, in the Security Council of the United Nations. Needless to say, the United States is not interested in an increasingly substantial role in emerging intergovernmental organizations.

 

Noteworthy as well is that the Ukraine crisis has resulted in explicit expressions of discontent by the developing world regarding the current polarized and inconsistent world order. The United Nations resolutions in the Security Council and the General Assembly clearly expressed this dissatisfaction. The majority of states ultimately voted against the Russian occupation of Ukraine's territory, which is condemnable. Nevertheless, significant numbers, including "democracies "with large populations, either abstained from voting or refused to implement sanctions against Russia.

 

The revisiting of the world order in a more serious fashion is, I believe, a vital novel situation, even if its progress is slow and incremental. All three superpowers are slowly starting to court developing countries for support. Russia and America seek their consolation because of Ukraine, while China's reasons rely on the American and its allies' opposition to its landmark belt and road project, which is meant to expand its global network and matrix. This is the time for developing countries to make constructive, rigorous proposals for making the international order more equitable, even if, for now, by initiating an incremental process that will be time-consuming.

 

Scrutinized Security Arrangements

Another notable consequence of the last twelve months is that the credibility and reliability of superpower security arrangements, informal or formal, have been questioned. Even if the situation in Ukraine is not as bad as projected in western media, the underperformance there is notable, and has also led those who depended on or feared Russian military capabilities to reassess their calculations. Russia had to import weapons systems like the Iranian drones, which raises serious reliability issues regarding its potential security support in regions strategically important to the west.

 

The west, particularly the United States, has unquestionably mustered substantial and significant military and financial support for Ukraine. However, it did not go unnoticed that no western country openly provided national military ground troops. This point was clearly noticed by western allies around the world who did not have the personnel capacity to take on substantial threats and considered vital ‘unwavering reliability’ as a deterrent towards neighbouring adversaries. Noteworthy, as well, were public pronouncements by American officials clearly cautioning friends not to assume that the United States would put its personnel in harm's way.

 

Therefore, the reliability and credibility of both American and Russian security arrangements have been brought to task these last twelve months. And this resonated across the globe with the North Koreans testing numerous ballistic missiles and the president openly and rather bombastically declaring that his country wanted to be the most potent nuclear power in the world. China responded to this by issuing a declaration affirming its support for North Korean security, partially as a reaction to America repeatedly raising the "One China" policy, but probably also to calm North Korea and ensure things don't get out of hand.

 

In conclusion, I believe, 2022 planted the seeds of a gradual change in the international order. The superpowers no longer hold an aura of invincibility. The United States and the west will continue as military and economic strongholds, but with a much-restricted stature. It also brought into question the reliability of foreign security arrangements which will fuel arms races in volatile regions around the globe, further exacerbating and regionalizing conflicts.